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OCEAN ACIDIFICATION POLICY: APPLYING THE
LESSONS OF WASHINGTON TO CALIFORNIA
AND BEYOND
Ryan P. Kelly*
ABSTRACT: This Article aims to distill the lessons of Washington’s experience
with ocean acidification (OA) policy and apply them to the political framework
that exists in California. More generally, this Article evaluates the political
landscape in which OA policy is taking shape along the west coast of the United
States and highlights elements of a political and policy strategy that would build
current momentum on OA in California and elsewhere into a larger, more
sustained policy infrastructure capable of addressing coastal issues of
environmental resilience and water quality in the context of global change. It
concludes by identifying some ways in which OA policy might benefit from action
on—and constituencies for—the multiple interacting drivers of environmental
change. 1

* Assistant Professor, School of Marine and Environmental Affairs, University of
Washington; J.D., University of California, Berkley, School of Law (Boalt Hall); Ph.D.,
Columbia University. Email: rpkelly@uw.edu.
1. In gathering information in the fall of 2016, I had discussions with a cross-section
of professionals in California and Washington, all of whom had significant histories of
policy or scientific engagement on the issues. I distilled the respondents’ comments and
framed them against the backdrop of the major relevant laws and institutions governing
environmental policy in the two states, referencing current legal and scientific literature
only where necessary to support key points. Throughout, I have provided opinion about
likely outcomes or trajectories of change; where I have done so, I have tried to make
apparent the factual basis for this opinion.
My interviewees included Lisa Graumlich (Dean, University of Washington College
of the Environment), Jan Newton (University of Washington and Co-Director,
Washington Ocean Acidification Center), Terrie Klinger (University of Washington and
Co-Director, Washington Ocean Acidification Center), Steve Weisberg (Southern
California Coastal Water Research Project), Ali Boehm (Stanford University), Jen
Phillips (California Ocean Protection Council), Meg Caldwell (David and Lucile Packard
Foundation), Skyli McAfee (The Nature Conservancy, formerly Executive Director,
California Ocean Science Trust), Cat Kuhlman (formerly Executive Director, California
Ocean Protection Council and Deputy Secretary, Oceans and Coastal Policy), Terry
Sawyer (Founding Partner, Hog Island Oyster Company), Ashley Erickson (Stanford
University, Center for Ocean Solutions), and Jodie Toft (The Nature Conservancy,
Washington). In addition, earlier drafts of this Article benefitted from comments by
Matt Armsby (Resources Legacy Fund), Sarah Cooley and George Leonard (Ocean
Conservancy), Steve Weisberg, and Emily Knight (California Ocean Science Trust). Note
that the views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of
individual interviewees, and neither do they necessarily represent consensus among
interviewees. Rather, I have summarized trends in responses and overarching themes.
Any errors are my own.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ocean acidification (OA) is the global change in the marine
chemical environment—a significant decrease in pH, towards a
more acidic state—that has resulted from humanity’s CO2
emissions over the course of the industrial era.2 As with other
large-scale ocean changes such as warming, sea-level rise,
hypoxia, and shifts in species assemblages (including an
increase in harmful algal blooms), OA will alter marine
ecosystems and the associated services on which humans have
come to depend.3
Recent years have seen a spike in OA science, leading directly

2. See generally J.-P. Gattuso et al., Contrasting Futures for Ocean and Society from
Different Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions Scenarios, 349 SCI. 1, 3 (2015),
http://hal.upmc.fr/hal-01176217/document.
3. Id.
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to an increase in public awareness and political attention.4 The
legal and policy responses to OA have only started to take shape
in the past few years,5 as the scope of the challenge has become
clearer. Any approach to tackle OA must marry political
opportunity to scientific insight.
OA is mainly a global CO2-driven problem6—although local
exacerbating factors can shift the policy calculus to favor local
mitigating actions—which undermines any given jurisdiction’s
options and incentives for acting to mitigate its effects.
Nevertheless, the State of Washington has made financial and
political commitments that have already been a model for other
jurisdictions wishing to combat OA.7 Washington’s experience
suggests there are political and scientific opportunities in
California, Oregon, and elsewhere, despite inevitable state-level
differences in the political landscape.
Although Washington continues to lead other jurisdictions on
OA policy, its actions remain focused on scientific research and
monitoring, rather than on combating the causes or effects of
OA.8 Any jurisdiction wishing to actually mitigate OA will have
to go further than Washington has gone to date, by curbing
anthropogenic inputs to the ocean or buffering the social and
ecological effects of an already-changed ocean. However, a
critical question remains unanswered pending experimental
4. Sarah R. Cooley et al., Community-Level Actions that Can Address Ocean
Acidification, 2 FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCI. 1, 3 (2016) (“On the North American Pacific
coast, California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia have agreed to share
information and combat ocean acidification by urging the American and Canadian
governments to further research, model, and monitor their shared waters for ocean
acidification through the Pacific Coast Collaborative.”).
5. See, e.g., Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten Ways States Can Combat
Ocean Acidification (and Why They Should), 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (2013)
[hereinafter Ten Ways]; Raphaël Billé et al., Taking Action Against Ocean Acidification:
A Review of Management and Policy Options, 52 ENVTL. MGMT. 761 (2013); Aaron L.
Strong et al., Ocean Acidification 2.0: Managing our Changing Coastal Ocean
Chemistry, 64 BIOSCIENCE 581 (2014).
6. Gattuso et al., supra note 2, at 1.
7. For example, the California-led West Coast Ocean Acidification & Hypoxia Panel,
discussed throughout this Article. “Inspired by the groundbreaking work of the
Washington Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification, the [California Ocean Protection
Council] asked Ocean Science Trust to establish a scientific advisory panel on ocean
acidification and hypoxia (OAH) in collaboration with Oregon, Washington, and British
Columbia.” History, THE WEST COAST OCEAN ACIDIFICATION & HYPOXIA SCI. PANEL,
http://westcoastoah.org/history/ (last visited June 12, 2017).
8. Washington has a variety of CO2-focused efforts aimed at curbing climate change,
but I omit these here because they arose independently of the OA policies.
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and modeling work: which state actions could have a
measurable and meaningful impact on OA? Unless and until the
scientific data are available to demonstrate the likely effect of
such state action, it is unlikely that an agency will be willing to
invest the time and political capital necessary to develop new
rules. Even given a convincing demonstration of OA policy
changes, effective social and economic adaptation to an
inevitably changing ocean will require additional political
leadership that has not yet arisen in Washington or elsewhere.
Although basic science, modeling, and monitoring continue to be
essential to address key unanswered questions in the OA policy
landscape, it is clear that ocean chemistry will continue to
change at an accelerating rate in the absence of governmental
action to reduce inputs into the coastal ocean.9
In this short Article, I summarize the state of affairs—both
politically and scientifically—in Washington and California
regarding OA, the specific political motivations for action in
Washington and California, and the lessons of the past several
years that might benefit California and other jurisdictions.
Then, I discuss a set of emerging issues at the science/policy
boundary with respect to OA along the West Coast, via a list of
key questions that interviewees raised, before concluding.
II.

THE POLITICAL & SCIENTIFIC BACKDROP IN
WASHINGTON AND CALIFORNIA

A.

Recent Governmental Action

Washington and California have taken up OA policy as a
result of different motivating factors, and these differences are
informative for framing the next steps of OA policy in these
states and elsewhere.
Washington’s motivation for action on OA was a combination
of a fortuitous political moment and an environmental problem
that had started to harm the culturally important shellfish
industry. The state’s oyster industry used a single point of
contact10 to successfully advocate first for financial support from

9. See generally, e.g., Gattuso et al., supra note 2. See also Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean
Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV. OF MARINE SCI. 169 (2009).
10. Bill Dewey, Director of Public Affairs for Taylor Shellfish. See 2012 Panel Members
and
Meetings,
WASH.
STATE
DEP’T
OF
ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html (last visited June 12, 2017)
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the federal government11 and then political support from the
state government.12 The then-governor was receptive to taking
action on environmental issues in general, but likely especially
so in 2012, which was her final year in office. By that time, data
from NOAA’s Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory had
become available and solidified the science of OA in the region.13
In sum, industry drove action in Washington, and found willing
partners in scientists and the state government.
In 2012, Washington created a Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean
Acidification, highlighting the shift in ocean chemistry as a
political issue on the West Coast.14 The Panel developed a set of
political and scientific recommendations,15 and the State
successfully implemented a number of these recommendations
in the succeeding years. Legislation in 2013 established the
Marine Resources Advisory Council (MRAC) within the office of
the Governor to coordinate work within the state and at the
University of Washington on OA and to advise the Governor and
state legislature on related matters.16 The same year saw the
legislature allocate funding to the Washington Ocean
(highlighting Dewey’s involvement on the Blue Ribbon Panel as the key shellfish
industry representative).
11. In 2010, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell’s office helped provide financial support for
real-time ocean-chemistry monitoring equipment that came to the industry’s aid,
particularly in Washington. See Cantwell Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Establish
National Ocean Acidification Monitoring Strategy, MARIA CANTWELL U.S. SENATOR FOR
WASH. (July 30, 2015), https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cantwellintroduces-bipartisan-bill-to-establish-national-ocean-acidification-monitoringstrategy.
12. In late 2011, then-Governor Gregoire initiated the Washington Blue Ribbon Panel
on Ocean Acidification partly in response to industry entreaties. See Washington
Shellfish Initiative Ocean Acidification Blue Ribbon Panel Charter, WASH. STATE DEP’T
OF ECOLOGY (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/charter.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Richard A. Feely et al., The Combined Effects of Ocean Acidification,
Mixing, and Respiration on pH and Carbonate Saturation in an Urbanized Estuary, 88
ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 442 (2010). See also Alan Barton et al., The Pacific
Oyster, Crassostrea Gigas, Shows Negative Correlation to Naturally Elevated Carbon
Dioxide Levels: Implications for Near-Term Ocean Acidification Effects, 57 LIMNOLOGY
& OCEANOGRAPHY 698, 698 (2012).
14. See WASH. STATE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION:
FROM
KNOWLEDGE
TO
ACTION
(2012),
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1201015.pdf
[hereinafter
KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION]. See 2012 Blue Ribbon Panel on Ocean Acidification, WASH.
STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/2012panel.html (last
visited June 12, 2017).
15. KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION, supra note 14.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016).
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Acidification Center at the University of Washington for
research and monitoring purposes. 17
A second element advancing the policy discussion in
Washington was—and continues to be—lawsuits filed by the
Center for Biological Diversity (CBD). These suits bear directly
on the state’s official reaction to its changing water chemistry.
CBD filed the first OA-related lawsuit against the U.S. EPA in
2009, challenging that agency’s approval of Washington’s 2008
list of impaired waters (required under Section 303(d) of the
Clean Water Act).18 Although Washington was not the
defendant in that suit or in subsequent ones, the CBD lawsuits
put the state on notice that it was under national scrutiny for
its handling of OA. The EPA eventually settled the suit, and, as
a result of the settlement, the EPA requested data on OA and
considered altering the national guideline for marine pH. 19 The
EPA ultimately decided against the change, citing insufficient
information to change the federal standard.20 To date, no state
has created a more stringent guideline.
In a more recent suit, CBD again lost on substantive grounds,
largely as a result of a limited ability to tie global trends in OA
to here-and-now violations of water quality criteria within state
waters.21 However, the group won an important procedural
battle in the District Court for the Western District of
Washington in 2015 by establishing causation and
redressability in its suit over the EPA’s 2012 approval of
Washington’s and Oregon’s 2010 303(d) lists. 22 There, CBD
successfully highlighted the possibility that state-level total
17. Id. § 79.105.150.
18. Meline MacCurdy, EPA to Consider Ocean Acidification Under Section 303(d) of
Clean
Water
Act,
MARTEN
LAW
(April
1,
2010),
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100401-cwa-ocean-acidification
(citing
Complaint at 2–3, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, No. 2:09-cv-00670-JCC
(W.D. Wash. filed May 14, 2009), 2009 WL 1390743).
19. Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Notice of Call for Public Comment on 303(d)
Program and Ocean Acidification, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,537 (Mar. 22, 2010).
20. See Barton et al., supra note 13. See also EPA, MEMORANDUM ON INTEGRATED
REPORTING AND LISTING DECISIONS RELATED TO OCEAN ACIDIFICATION (2010),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201601/documents/memo_integrated_reporting_and_listing_decisions_related_to_ocean_aci
dfication.pdf.
21. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
22. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. EPA, 90 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1190 (W.D. Wash.
2015) (highlighting the possibility that state-level TMDLs could provide a remedy to
coastal OA by reducing local inputs likely to exacerbate the global CO 2-driven trend).
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maximum daily loads (TMDLs) could provide a remedy to
coastal OA by reducing local inputs that are likely to exacerbate
the global CO2-driven trend.23 More broadly, CBD’s repeated
lawsuits likely function as a constraint on the state’s decisionmaking with respect to water quality criteria, insofar as they
prevent the state from ignoring its changing ocean chemistry
with impunity.
In contrast to Washington, California’s initial motivation to
tackle OA as a policy issue came from governmental (and
politically connected non-governmental) scientists, who wanted
to know if those same issues highlighted in Washington also
mattered in California.24 In particular, it was unclear whether
OA in California was likely to be of a policy-relevant magnitude
and whether OA threatened California’s marine protected
areas. The inquiry fell to the California Ocean Protection
Council (OPC), a non-regulatory, cabinet-level body that
coordinates administrative agencies and suggests legislative
and policy actions on ocean issues in California.25
In 2013, the OPC asked the Ocean Science Trust (OST)—a
non-profit entity created by state statute that works to integrate
science and decision-making across state agencies—to
commission a panel to study the effects of OA, as well as OA’s
linkages with hypoxia.26 The OPC convened twenty leading
experts in the field of OA from California, Oregon, Washington,
and British Columbia, creating the West Coast Ocean
Acidification & Hypoxia Science Panel (OA/H Panel). 27 At least
four elements favored adding hypoxia to the mix of salient ocean
23. Id. at 1195–96 (finding that CBD established causation and redressability, Judge
Robart reasoned that “the relief CBD seeks—the listing of acidified-impaired waters—
is the necessary forerunner to the establishment of TMDLs or other water quality
improvement techniques, and, according to Congress, the appropriate means of
achieving desired water quality.”).
24. Although this assertion arose from interviews with OA/H Panel members, some
additional support may be found in the fact that the California Panel’s website lists the
Washington Panel’s report first among its linked “Key Documents.” See History, THE
WEST
COAST
OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION
AND
HYPOXIA
SCI.
PANEL,
http://westcoastoah.org/history/ (last visited June 13, 2017).
25. See About the Council, CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, http://www.opc.ca.gov/about/
(last visited June 13, 2017). The OPC was created by the California Ocean Protection
Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 35500. See infra Part VI for a more detailed description of
OPC and other key institutions in California and Washington that are relevant to OA.
26. F. CHAN ET. AL., THE WEST COAST OCEAN ACIDIFICATION AND HYPOXIA SCIENCE
PANEL: MAJOR FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ACTIONS 4 (2016).
27. Id. at 32.
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focal points worthy of study: (1) Oregon’s participation on the
OA/H Panel—where commercial fisheries’ losses due to hypoxia
were a key concern; (2) public comment; (3) OPC and Ocean
Science Trust’s desire to evaluate OA in a multi-stressor
context; and (4) then-OPC Executive Director Cat Kuhlman’s
significant background interest in water quality.28
One further enabling condition surrounding the OA/H Panel
and California’s involvement in OA as a policy issue was the
existence of the California Current Acidification Network (CCAN), a network for sharing OA information West Coast-wide.29
The goal of C-CAN is to keep a wide variety of stakeholders
informed, evenhandedly serving industry, academia, and
relevant government scientists.30 It may be that C-CAN
facilitated a degree of consensus among a more diverse set of
groups than was actually represented on the OA/H Panel,
creating a background level political support for the panel and
for policy action more generally.31
In 2016, the OA/H Panel finalized a set of recommendations, 32
similar to the recommendations made by Washington’s Blue
Ribbon Panel, creating a significant opportunity in California
for political action on OA. Two new California state laws offer a
partial response to the Panel’s recommendations: AB 2139
(Williams, Ocean Acidification and Hypoxia Task Force) 33 and
28. This list of rationales for including hypoxia comes from interviews with OA/H
Panel participants and leadership.
29. CAL. CURRENT ACIDIFICATION NETWORK, VISION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A WEST
COAST NETWORK MONITORING MARINE ACIDIFICATION AND ITS LINKAGE TO BIOLOGICAL
EFFECTS IN THE NEARSHORE ENVIRONMENT (2013), http://www.c-can.info/reference/CCAN%20%20Vision%20Document%20Final.pdf.
30. Id. at 2.
31. For further discussion on this point see Sarah R. Cooley et al., Getting Ocean
Acidification on Decision Makers’ To-Do Lists: Dissecting the Process Through Case
Studies, 28 OCEANOGRAPHY 198, 204 (2015).
32. CHAN ET AL., supra note 26. There is substantial overlap in the recommendations
of the two panels, with the latter panel additionally highlighting (a) the desirability of
understanding interactions among multiple stressors, and (b) the need for West Coastwide collaboration on scientific and policy action. Jan Newton (a member of both Panels,
and co-director of the Washington Ocean Acidification Center) generated a “crosswalk”
between the recommendations of the Washington and California panels, presented to
the Washington Marine Resources Advisory Council on April 25, 2016. See WASH. STATE
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, COALESCING SCIENCE FOR POLICY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WEST
COAST
OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION
AND
HYPOXIA
SCIENCE
PANEL,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/20160425MRAChypoxiapanel.pdf (last visited
June 13, 2017).
33. California Ocean Protection Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35631 (West Supp. 2017).
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SB 1363 (Monning, Ocean Acidification and Hypoxia Reduction
Program).34 These new laws are important mainly because they
represent official recognition of OA as a challenge to coastal
environmental quality, rather than for any new authority they
provide. Nevertheless, the laws illustrate California’s official
recognition of OA and hypoxia-related issues, and of the state’s
emerging role in responding to these issues.
Washington’s Blue Ribbon Panel and California’s OA/H Panel
illustrate the political momentum surrounding OA as an
environmental issue and the growth of that momentum in
recent years. The question is, what’s next? How will
Washington, California, or other states take action to mitigate
and adapt to OA, and what are the politically feasible paths to
these end goals?
B.

Latitudinal Differences in Water Chemistry and Relevance
for OA Politics

A key biophysical difference between California and
Washington is relevant to the political and policy analysis that
follows. On the whole, Washington’s Puget Sound—where most
of the state’s human population is clustered35 and the location
of a significant portion of its aquaculture36—experiences OA to
a somewhat greater degree than California or most other
jurisdictions in the U.S. In part, this is because the calcium
carbonate saturation state (𝛺)37—a key factor for understanding
(“. . . the council may develop an ocean acidification and hypoxia science task force to
ensure that decisionmaking is supported by the best available science.”) The Act also
includes mandatory language—subject to the availability of funding—for adaptive and
potentially mitigative measures, including “ensure that criteria and standards for
coastal water health to address ocean acidification and hypoxia are developed and
informed by the best available science.” Id.
34. California Ocean Protection Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630, 35632 (West
Supp. 2017). (“[OPC] shall establish and administer the Ocean Acidification and
Hypoxia Reduction Program,” which includes demonstration projects of multiple
stressors, inventories of candidate sites for mitigation, and other elements.).
35. See generally WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT. FORECASTING & RESEARCH DIV.,
STATE
OF
WASHINGTON
2016
POPULATION
TRENDS
(2016),
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/april1/poptrends.pdf.
36. See generally Overview Saving Puget Sound, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/puget_sound/overview.html (last visited June 13, 2017).
37. This parameter reflects the chemical balance of compounds in seawater that affect
species’ ability to build shells and other hard parts. See Ocean Acidification: Saturation
State,
NAT’L
OCEANIC
&
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
https://sos.noaa.gov/Datasets/dataset.php?id=173 (last visited June 13, 2017). Higher
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the impacts of changing pH on shell-forming marine life—is
naturally lower at higher latitudes.38 The building blocks of
animals’ shell material—calcite and aragonite—are less stable
at lower 𝛺.39 The deep, fjord-like shape of Puget Sound (setting
up stratification and high-CO2, low-𝛺 conditions at depth due to
respiration), and a narrow continental shelf with significant
upwelling (bringing low-𝛺 water to the surface) exacerbate the
latitudinal effect.40 By contrast, California’s more open coastline
is somewhat warmer (particularly in the Southern California
Bight) and less stratified, and therefore tends to have overall
higher ambient levels of 𝛺 despite similar coastal upwelling in
places.41
In practical terms, this means Washington’s marine
ecosystems are likely to be some years ahead of California in
terms of exposure to OA. At present, we lack smoking-gun
evidence of OA impacts in California of the kind that have led
to political interest in Washington, where the well-organized
shellfish industry quickly perceived that it was losing money as
a result of OA and committed to raising and sustaining political
attention to the issue.42 In California, other aspects of changing
ocean conditions—for example, increases in sea-surface
temperature linked to outbreaks of harmful algal blooms
(HABs),43 as happened in 2015 and 2016—are indeed driving
values of 𝛺 mean that it is easier for marine species—such as oysters, mussels, corals,
and many others—to build shells. Id. A value higher than 1 indicates an energetically
favorable environment to build and maintain shell material, while a value less than 1
indicates an environment in which species have to expend energy maintaining shell
material to prevent it from dissolving. Id. The negative effects of OA on shell-forming
species has been one of the most visible impacts of OA to date, especially insofar as
industries, including aquaculture (e.g., oysters) and tourism (e.g., coral reefs), face
increasingly hostile ocean chemistry.
38. See, e.g., Taro Takahashi et al., Climatological Distributions of pH, pCO 2, Total
CO2, Alkalinity, and CaCO3 Saturation in the Global Surface Ocean, and Temporal
Changes at Selected Locations, 164 MARINE CHEMISTRY 95 (2014).
39. Barton et al., supra note 13.
40. Debby Ianson et al., Vulnerability of a Semienclosed Estuarine Sea to Ocean
Acidification in Contrast with Hypoxia, 43 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 5793, 5793
(2016).
41. See Takahashi et al., supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., Gov. Inslee’s Shellfish Initiative, WASH. GOVERNOR JAY INSLEE,
http://www.governor.wa.gov/issues/issues/energy-environment/shellfish (last visited
June 13, 2017) (noting shellfish industry partnership with the state government, and
noting OA as an issue area of concern).
43. A Harmful Algal Bloom is a phenomenon in which species of single-celled plantlike organisms (“algae” is the umbrella term for a large set of unrelated species that
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economic losses (e.g., in the Dungeness crab fishery).44 It may be
that OA exacerbates these effects, but again, no smoking gun
has yet surfaced.45
In light of these differences, existing political attention to the
issue of OA in California appears to be largely a testament to
the initiative of scientists, agency staff, and NGOs who have
raised the issue and managed to develop and advance
recommendations for new science and policy surrounding OA
and hypoxia, some of which were recently incorporated into
law.46 However, it seems likely that sustained policy attention
to these ocean issues will require a broader and deeper set of
constituencies than has yet come to the table in California.
Unless other and larger industries—such as tourism and
commercial and recreational fishing—are engaged on the issue,
it seems likely that the active constituency for action on OA will
continue to be limited to a small coalition of actors with, in turn,
limited political influence.
meet this description; “alga” is the singular) grow rapidly and produce toxins that can
harm humans and other animals. For NOAA’s description of the issue and its effects,
see Harmful Algal Blooms, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/hazards/hab/ (last visited May 9, 2017).
44. A compendium of regulations relevant to the 2016 Dungeness crab fishery closure
is available online. See Emergency Regulations to Keep Dungeness Crab Commercial
Fishery Closed North of Point Reyes and Close Rock Crab Commercial Fishery North of
Pigeon Point (Section 131, Title 14, CCR), CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE,
https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Notices/Regulations/Emergency-Crab-Closure-2016
(last
visited June 13, 2017). The archive of news bulletins from California Department of Fish
and Wildlife regarding the 2015 and 2016 closures is available online as well. See
Invertebrates
of
Interest:
Crabs,
CAL.
DEP’T
FISH
&
WILDLIFE,
https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/conservation/marine/invertebrates/crabs (last visited June
13, 2017).
45. Put more bluntly: no one is yet losing money in California as a result of OA. As in
Washington, California’s most active industry on OA and related issues has been
aquaculture. For example, Hog Island Oysters has been politically engaged on OA and
has acquired two high-precision ocean chemistry sensors (Burkelators) to help adapt to
changing ocean chemistry, demonstrating the degree to which the aquaculture industry
is concerned with the issue. See Hog Island’s description of its own work in the field,
available at: Ocean Acidification Research, HOG ISLAND OYSTER CO.,
https://hogislandoysters.com/science-policy/ocean-acidification-research (last visited
May 9, 2017). But by comparison, the role of Taylor Shellfish in Washington appears to
have been much more substantial in terms of driving policy outcomes. For example, Bill
Dewey, Director of Public Affairs for Taylor Shellfish, was a member of Washington’s
Blue Ribbon Panel, see 2012 Panel Members and Meetings, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF
ECOLOGY, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html (last visited May 9, 2017),
and was directly involved in Washington’s political education surrounding OA as an
environmental issue.
46. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630–35632 (West Supp. 2017).
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III. WASHINGTON AS A BLUEPRINT FOR CALIFORNIA
Below, I compare Washington and California along three
axes—legal authority, the political framing of OA as an
environmental issue and the relevant forums for developing OA
policy—before analyzing the particular lessons of the
Washington experience in terms of strategic mistakes to be
avoided and missing constituencies. I then highlight important
scientific unknowns, the use of Water Quality Criteria as a
useful (but politically difficult) policy tool, and finally, the role
communications and messaging plays for OA and related
challenges.
A.

Frameworks for Addressing OA in California and
Washington

1.

Authority

Legislative (or, by extension, agency) authority is not the
factor that most immediately limits policy action on OA in either
Washington or California. As in all states, these jurisdictions
have broad authority to regulate water quality—including
authority to do so more stringently than federal law
demands47—and to fashion other remedies for environmental
problems largely as they see fit. 48 In Washington, the only
legislation explicitly providing authority for ocean acidification
policy is that which created the Marine Resources Advisory
Council (MRAC)—an advisory body with no permanent funding
and few mandatory duties49—although the state’s baseline
authority to regulate water quality and air quality is sufficiently
broad to encompass many of the proposed policy actions dealing
with OA, hypoxia, and related chemical changes,50 such as
47. See, e.g., Ten Ways, supra note 5, for an extended discussion of this authority with
respect to OA.
48. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.48.260(a) (2016), (b); CAL. WATER CODE §§
13001–13002 (West 2009).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016). See infra Part VI for additional information
on MRAC.
50. Under the Washington State Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.48 (2016), the Department of Ecology has the authority to “prevent and control the
pollution of the waters of the state.” Id. § 90.48.030. Because “pollution” is broadly
defined to include both point- and nonpoint-source pollution, id. § 90.48.020, Ecology
has the authority to prevent and control nonpoint source pollution in the state. This
authority extends to proactive actions to abate sources with “substantial potential” to
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minimizing terrestrial nutrient inputs, stormwater, and
greenhouse gases.51 Despite broad authority to mitigate and
abate nonpoint sources, Washington currently has no express
provision for nonpoint source permitting.52 California now has
two laws expressly directing OPC to work on OA and related
issues.53 Moreover, California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act54 expressly regulates point and nonpoint source
pollution via waste discharge requirements, waivers of these
requirements, and larger-scale basin plans (i.e. regional water
quality control plan); these may include a variety of standards,
regulations, and, if needed, prohibitions.55
Taken together, the existing set of legislative authorities
mean that Washington and California, like many other
jurisdictions, have ample authority to carry out point- and
nonpoint-source water quality improvements to combat OA and
hypoxia. California, however, unlike Washington, has a
nonpoint source permitting program in place already, 56 which
would be a valuable tool in any OA policy that aimed, for
example, to reduce OA-exacerbating local-scale inputs into the
coastal zone.
2.

Viewing OA as a Political Issue

Jurisdictions must have political incentives for action on OA,
or else they will not take such action. Consequently, the way in
which OA is framed greatly affects how policy suggestions are

pollute the state’s waters. Id. A useful 2015 overview of the state’s nonpoint source
pollution plan (and related authorities) is available at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/Wq/nonpoint/index.html.
51. See Ten Ways, supra note 5.
52. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUBL’N NO. 15-10-015, WASHINGTON’ S
WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCES OF POLLUTION
(2015), https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1510015.pdf (describing the
state’s efforts to control nonpoint source pollution, which notably do not include a
permitting system).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34.
54. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., PORTER-COLOGNE WATER QUALITY
CONTROL ACT WATER CODE DIVISION SEVEN AND RELATED SECTIONS (Apr. 2017).
55. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., POLICY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM, RESOLUTION
NO. 2004-0030 (2004). California’s nonpoint source pollution plan, along with
enforcement
and
implementation
information,
is
available
at
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/nps/plans_policies.shtml.
56. Id. at 4–5.
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received and, in turn, whether they are implemented. In
Washington and California—as elsewhere in the United
States—state and local jurisdictions have some additional legal
and policy options to mitigate OA.57 However, it remains
difficult to assess the benefits of these interventions relative to
their costs, in part because there are few compelling
demonstration projects underway.58 Moreover, there has been
little modeling or other research into the attribution of local
versus global drivers of OA, or of the relative costs and benefits
of different local source management measures and objectives,
leading to an overall lack of specific information that would
underpin regulatory or legislative action.59 Some policy options,
such as reducing nutrient inputs, may have benefits (and costs)
in addition to their effects on OA.60 If such follow-on benefits
outweigh the costs at the appropriate spatial and jurisdictional
scales, this kind of action might be a “no regret” solution—that
is, one that the jurisdiction may find it reasonable to pursue
even in the absence of OA. Finding actions with such co-benefits
is a stated goal of SB 1363, newly enacted in California.61
Jurisdictions have no demonstrated ability to mitigate OA
yet, and the incentives to undertake significant mitigation vary

57. These include water-quality controls, land-use controls, nearshore remediation
with eelgrass, direct CO 2 reduction, and a host of other options. For a full discussion of
these in a legal context, see, e.g., Ten Ways, supra note 5; R.P. KELLY & M. CALDWELL,
CTR. FOR OCEAN SOLUTIONS, WHY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION MATTERS TO CALIFORNIA, AND
WHAT CALIFORNIA CAN DO ABOUT IT 38 (2012) [hereinafter WHY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION
MATTERS]; and R.P. KELLY & J. GROTE STOUTENBURG, CTR. FOR OCEAN SOLUTIONS,
WASHINGTON STATE’S LEGAL AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR COMBATING OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION IN STATE WATERS 51 (2012). See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630,
35631, 35632 (West Supp. 2017).
58. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630, 35632(a)(1) (West Supp. 2017) requires such
demonstration projects, but even if these were started immediately, their results would
not be available for some years.
59. A notable and recent exception is R.A. Feely et al., Chemical and Biological
Impacts of Ocean Acidification Along the West Coast of North America, 183 ESTUARINE,
COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 260 (2016) (apportioning the responsibility for regional chemical
changes between anthropogenic carbon inputs and respiration by organisms living in
the water).
60. See WHY OCEAN ACIDIFICATION MATTERS, supra note 57 (discussing options and
co-benefits).
61. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35632(b) (West Supp. 2017) (“In advancing approaches in
the program to remove carbon dioxide from seawater, the council shall consider
approaches that provide multiple cobenefits, including, but not limited to, providing
essential fish and bird habitat, improving water quality, and mitigating the impacts of
sea level rise.”).
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by geography, driver, and the financial and political costs and
benefits of any proposed action. Both as a strategic and as a
practical matter, then, a reasonable next step for OA policy
would be to (1) conceive of OA as part of a larger basket of waterquality issues that jurisdictions can (and may want to) address,
together with hypoxia, nutrient pollution, warming, and
perhaps sea-level rise, and (2) simultaneously work toward
adoption and implementation of adaptation strategies to reduce
social/economic impacts of OA and related ocean change.
California has taken a significant step towards the first of these
points by linking hypoxia and OA through the OA/H Panel. But
West Coast-wide policy might benefit from seeing OA as a
leading indicator of a changing ocean, broadening the tent under
which diverse constituencies can fit. Put differently, OA might
be useful to spur action on the suite of other ocean changes
(warming, deoxygenation, stratification, etc.) that are
interacting with OA in ways that we do not yet understand. 62
Because each of these changes or issues may have its own
constituency—stemming from the costs of each to different
industries, for example—explicitly linking these related
changes is a way to frame regional/global ocean change as
relevant to state and local policy.63
Nevertheless, it is important to be able to single out the
particular effects of OA—as distinct from other aspects of ocean
change—for making the case for specific policy and regulatory
changes, budget appropriations, outreach, and other purposes.
One needs to point to a specific phenomenon of concern, rather
than simply “ocean change.” It therefore makes sense to develop
a decision-making model in which several key elements of ocean
change—again, each perhaps having its own political
constituency—are modules that fit together into a larger whole.
3.

Forum
Washington’s MRAC has reportedly been successful as a low-

62. For examples and discussion of multistressor impacts to particular organisms, see
generally Nina Bednaršek et al., Pteropods on the Edge: Cumulative Effects of Ocean
Acidification, Warming, and Deoxygenation, 145 PROGRESS IN OCEANOGRAPHY 1 (2016);
Maria Byrne & Rachel Przeslawski, Multistressor Impacts of Warming and Acidification
of the Ocean on Marine Invertebrates’ Life Histories, 53.4 INTEGRATIVE AND
COMPARATIVE BIOLOGY 582 (2013).
63. Perhaps this framing would be a reasonable topic for future communications and
political science research.
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pressure environment in which a set of interested parties with
quite different interests can share views and data.64 Members
include state elected officials; tribal representatives; shellfish,
recreational, and commercial fishing industries; other business
interests, NGOs, government agencies (including state
departments of Agriculture, Public Lands, Fish & Wildlife,
Ecology, and others, as well as the U.S. EPA); and others.65 The
strengths of this body are its multidisciplinary expertise, its
non-regulatory (and hence, low-stakes) nature, and its official
status in the Governor’s office, suggesting its importance as an
advisory body.66 Its weaknesses are a lack of dedicated funding
and staff, and its non-regulatory role. Essentially, it has neither
carrot nor stick with which to spur specific on-the-ground
action, but instead generates value by developing a set of shared
views across diverse sets of interests.
By contrast, California’s OPC and State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB)—a state agency with authority over
both water quality and water quantity67—have greater
legislative authority and far more permanence than the MRAC.
Both are state agencies with specific mandates, permanent
staffs, in-house expertise—and, in the case of SWRCB,
regulatory authority.68 With respect to the OPC, the nonregulatory nature of the agency can be helpful because it creates
a non-threatening forum for hashing out differences among
stakeholders (similar to the MRAC in Washington).69 This
function of the OPC will not change under the agency’s new
legal mandates regarding OA and hypoxia, although the explicit
mandates the new legislation provides—the Task Force and the

64. Interview with Jan Newton, Co-Director, Wash. Ocean Acidification Ctr., in
Seattle, Wash. (Sept. 21, 2016); Interview with Lisa Graumlich, Dean, College of the
Environment, Univ. of Wash., in Seattle, Wash. (Sept. 19, 2016).
65. Information
about
the
Council
is
available
at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited June 13,
2017); meeting documents and products are also available at the same site. See also
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016) (listing membership of the Council).
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338(1) (2016).
67. See generally CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD.,
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/about_us/ (last visited June 13, 2017).
68. Compare CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, http://www.opc.ca.gov/about/ (last visited
May 10, 2017), with CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD.,
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/about_us/ (last visited May 6, 2017).
69. Interview with Cat Kuhlman, former Exec. Dir., Cal. Ocean Prot. Council (Oct. 5,
2016).
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Reduction Program70—seem likely to spur the agency to support
new data-collection and recommendations that could point
towards greater scrutiny of coastal contributors to OA.
It may be that a feedback loop between information supply
and demand will develop among California’s state agencies,
such that OPC-supported science might suggest answers to key
questions relevant for coastal mitigation strategies (e.g.,
eelgrass CO2 sequestration, coastal nutrient mitigation), with
SWRCB then demanding more specific information before
developing regulations in response to OPC’s findings. This
interaction—which I emphasize is speculative, at this point—
would not only create an iterative working relationship between
those agencies, but would also significantly depend upon the
existence of funding for carrying out the necessary science. If
OPC’s new legislative mandates come with the expectation of
further and more permanent funding, it seems likely that
California’s focus on OA and hypoxia might benefit related
scientific work on coastal ecosystems and ecosystem services in
the coastal zone more generally.
B.

Lessons for California and Other Jurisdictions

1.

Strategic Mistakes in Washington that California Could
Avoid

In moving forward on OA, California and other jurisdictions
have the opportunity to use Washington as an example of how
to create successful and actionable OA policies. Washington
made few obvious mistakes during its 2012 Blue Ribbon Panel
process and in the policy process that followed.71 Apart from
missing key constituencies—which I treat directly below in a
separate subsection—the only repeatedly perceived mistakes
were (1) the failure of the Washington process to tie OA to larger
trends in a changing ocean, such as HABs, warming and the

70. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34.
71. Here I report a synthesis of perceived mistakes reported by my interviewees, listed
above in note 1.
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warm blob,72 and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation 73 and El Niño 74;
and (2) the failure to tie OA to human communities and concerns
surrounding social/ecological resilience.
In part, the first of these perceived mistakes is only a mistake
in hindsight: the warm blob did not make its first appearance
until late 2013, after the bulk of the Washington process had
concluded.75 The relevant data linking OA to HABs were
lacking—and to some extent, remain thin76—and it is still not
obvious how cyclical phenomena such as the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation77 relate to directional phenomena such as OA.
California’s process leveraged more recent data and insight
when it linked OA with hypoxia; 78 the result of this more holistic
framing of OA-plus-hypoxia was a political and scientific
success, insofar as the outcome included two pieces of legislation
and increased scientific attention. It seems that agencies,
72. The “warm blob” was a large body of anomalously warm water in the Pacific Ocean
near the West Coast of North America beginning in 2013. The Blob: Warm Water off the
Coast of the PNW and What it May Mean for Our Summer Weather—A Message From
the State Climatologist, MAY EVENT SUMMARY (Office of the Wash. State Climatologist),
June 3, 2014, at 2–4. For a more technical discussion, see Nicholas A. Bond, Causes and
Impacts of the 2014 Warm Anomaly in the NE Pacific, 42 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH
LETTERS 3414 (2015).
73. The PDO is a phenomenon by which parts of the Pacific Ocean experience warmer
or colder phases over periods of decades. See Nathan J. Mantua & Steven R. Hare, The
Pacific Decadal Oscillation, 58 J. OCEANOGRAPHY 35, 37 (2002).
74. El Niño is the warm phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a largescale weather pattern that affects sea-surface temperatures, winds, and coastal
upwelling patterns—and hence primary productivity—worldwide. For an explanation of
the phenomenon, see generally El Niño & La Niña, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., https://www.climate.gov/enso (last visited June 13, 2017).
75. The Demise of the Warm Blob, EARTH OBSERVATORY (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=87513.
76. Research on several species indicates that CO 2 can play a role in promoting
toxicity in HABs. See, e.g., J. Sun et al., Effects of Changing pCO2 and Phosphate
Availability on Domoic Acid Production and Physiology of the Marine Harmful Bloom
Diatom Pseudo-Nitzschia multiseries, 56 LIMNOLOGY & OCEANOGRAPHY 829, 830
(2011); Fei-Xue Fu et al., CO2 and Phosphate Availability Control the Toxicity of the
Harmful Bloom Dinoflagellate Karlodinium veneficum, 59 AQUATIC MICROBIAL
ECOLOGY 55, 55–56 (2010); Avery O. Tatters et al., High CO2 Promotes the Production
of Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning Toxins by Alexandrium catenella from Southern
California Waters, 30 HARMFUL ALGAE 37, 41 (2013). However, this effect does not occur
in all species or subspecific strains. See Theresa Hattenrath-Lehmann, et al., The Effects
of Elevated CO2 on the Growth and Toxicity of Field Populations and Cultures of the
Saxitoxin-Producing Dinoflagellate, Alexandrium fundyense, 60 LIMNOLOGY &
OCEANOGRAPHY 198, 208 (2015).
77. See supra note 73.
78. See Chan et al., supra note 26 (citing literature from 2012 and later).
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industry, and others could make a stronger political case for
action on OA if they discussed OA as part of a broader set of
changing ocean conditions, to the extent this is feasible from a
management and scientific perspective.
As to the second perceived mistake, even now (as of early
2017), only limited data linking OA effects to resilience and
well-being in human communities are available.79 The
Washington process operated at the leading edge of scientific
information available at the time—and indeed, developed new
data on the fly in some instances—in an iterative, months-long
interaction between scientific and policy voices. 80 To the extent
that California and other jurisdictions seek to create effective
institutions and policy aims, better developing the science to
understand linkages between OA/hypoxia/ocean change and
human well-being seems a necessary step. As yet, there is little
information to act on. But in learning from the Washington
process, California and other jurisdictions need not simply wait
for such data to become available; instead, the OA policy process
can drive the creation of the necessary information through such
mechanisms as the OPC’s new Task Force and Reduction
Program.
2.

Missing Constituencies

A common thread between Washington’s experience with OA
policy and California’s emerging engagement on the issue is the
narrow set of constituencies that have so far been involved. In
both states, it has largely been academic and government
scientists, together with aquaculture and to some extent
conservation organizations, that have been responsible for
raising the public profile of OA.81 The only for-profit-sector
actors pushing for policy changes have been from the

79. See, e.g., J.A. Ekstrom et al., Vulnerability and Adaptation of US Shellfisheries to
Ocean Acidification, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 207, 207 (2015); Sarah R. Cooley et al.,
Nutrition and Income from Molluscs Today Imply Vulnerability to Ocean Acidification
Tomorrow, 13 FISH & FISHERIES 182, 185–86 (2012).
80. 2012 Panel Members and Meetings, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oa/panel.html (last visited June 13, 2017) (listing
links to panel documents from 2012 meetings). One can track the progress of the Panel’s
analysis over the summer of 2012 through these documents.
81. See supra note 64 and text accompanying notes 73–74. Both Panels’ websites list
the members’ affiliations; this is a good indication of the set of constituencies involved
to date.
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commercial aquaculture industry, which has so far played a
larger role in Washington than in California. It will be necessary
to engage a much broader and more diverse set of constituencies
to build and support a durable set of policy efforts surrounding
the changing coastal ocean. What follows is a selection of
potential constituencies that respondents named as being
missing from (or under-represented in) the state-level OA
conversations so far.


Commercial and recreational fishing industries.
Having lost money and jobs in 2015–16 as a result of
the warm blob and the attendant HABs82—more
symptoms of a changing ocean—these industries now
have an appreciation for the scale of the problems
they are facing, and may be receptive to advocating
for policy changes to mitigate or adapt to these
challenges. To the extent that future science ties OA
more directly to developmental or demographic
failures in commercially valuable species, one might
expect these industries to be increasingly interested
in the issue.



Native American tribes. Tribes in Washington have
already been engaged on the issue, from the Blue
Ribbon Panel to the MRAC and elsewhere.83 This
engagement will likely increase after the tribes’
victory in the Culvert Case. 84 In California, engaging
the tribes in a meaningful way has been particularly
important with respect to marine protected areas,85

82. For a roundup of economic effects of these phenomena, see West Coast Harmful
Algal Bloom, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/sep15/westcoasthabs.html (last visited June 13, 2017).
83. KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION supra note 14 (listing membership); Ocean Acidification
and Washington State, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited May 6, 2017)
(listing membership).
84. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming the role of
the treaty tribes in a suite of environmental policy decisions in Washington, most
directly to do with culverts blocking salmon habitat). The Culvert Case has implications
that go well beyond culverts and salmon; the logic underpinning the decision is that
upstream state-level decisions that can lead to a decline in salmon runs—and therefore,
a wide variety of land-use decisions well inland from the ocean—may violate tribes’
treaty rights to salmon. Id. at 853.
85. See, e.g., Dan Bacher, The Tension Between the Yurok Tribe and the State of
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but in California (and elsewhere), tribes remain
important potential voices on OA and ocean change
more generally.


Commercial agriculture and related industries.
Agriculture is a huge and indispensable industry,
and attempting to mitigate nonpoint source pollution
stemming from agricultural activities has been a
decades-long, conflict-laden effort with no clear
endpoint in sight.86 The industry is not likely to be
receptive to further efforts to minimize runoff and
nutrient pollution. However, several respondents in
this project saw OA as a relatively new lens through
which to talk about the effects of nutrient pollution,
and perhaps a means of “chipping away at the vitriol”
between environmental groups and agriculture.
Agriculture has an economic incentive not to over-use
fertilizer, the runoff of which is a potential
contributor to OA.87 Fertilizer costs money, and so
there is a possibility of a solution benefitting all
parties, but the economic risk of under-fertilizing
fields—and hence losing potential crop yields—is
often greater. OA as an additional potential effect of
agricultural runoff does not alter this balance of
incentives, which has remained in place for decades.
Nevertheless, simply ignoring the agriculture
industry is not an option for the future of OA policy,
particularly to the extent that nutrient reductions
are shown to be an effective tool for mitigating coastal
OA and hypoxia. In sum, some OA constituents see

California in Setting up the North Coast Marine Protected Areas, DAILYKOS (June 9,
2012),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/6/9/1098820/-Yurok-Tribe-challengesMLPA-Initiative-s-terminally-flawed-science.
86. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 120
(2d Cir. 1994) (finding that manure from a confined animal feeding operation is a point
source discharge for purposes of the Clean Water Act, and thus not subject to the Act’s
agricultural exemption, under which agricultural stormwater is a nonpoint source and
therefore exempt from permitting requirements); League of Wilderness Defs. Blue
Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the difference between a statutory Clean Water Act exemption for
agricultural nonpoint source discharges and silvicultural pest control); Waterkeeper
All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing “various challenges to [an
EPA regulation] under the Clean Water Act in order to abate and control the emission
of water pollutants from concentrated animal feeding operations.”).
87. See, e.g., KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION, supra note 14.
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OA as a new lens through which to view the politics
of agricultural runoff mitigation, but given the
economic incentives at play, no clear framing or
policy option currently exists for doing so.


Cities. In the view of at least one high-level
respondent, reducing nutrient loads from stormwater
is an easier target than nutrient loads from
agriculture, despite the high cost of the
infrastructure required for this kind of city-scale
mitigation. Existing federal programs under the
Clean Water Act, and other major infrastructure
financing, are likely to be useful in reducing runoff
from urban areas (e.g., via combined sewer
overflows), another no-regrets solution. A similar
logic applies to publicly-owned treatment works
(POTWs), which are point sources under the Clean
Water Act.88



Larger
environmental
NGO
communities.
Engagement from these groups to help develop
specific, actionable policy on OA—and for broader
policy response to a changing ocean—is important
and likely achievable by linking issue areas and
broadening the base of groups interested in ocean
change. Joining such groups in a longer-term
coalition would also be useful for improving the
outreach and communications capacity of the OA
constituency.



Federal agencies. Although NOAA is involved in OA
science (and to some extent, policy) via its OA
program,89 other federal agencies such as the Army
Corps and the EPA have been less engaged. Reaching
out to these agencies by speaking to their existing
nondiscretionary duties may create greater
cooperation and leverage existing resources.
Moreover, the EPA is responsible for implementing

88. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2016).
89. NOAA OCEAN ACIDIFICATION PROGRAM, http://oceanacidification.noaa.gov/ (last
visited June 13, 2017).
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the Clean Water Act90, and may play a potentially
important role in developing water-quality science,
criteria, and standards. With the change of
presidential administrations beginning in January
2017, it seems less likely that federal agencies will be
willing to undertake discretionary duties toward
these same ends.
Foundations. One high-level respondent suggested
that private foundations should be more involved
with developing options to mitigate and adapt to
coastal ocean change. The political and financial
capital these groups bring could help build a more
sustainable
political
coalition
and
policy
infrastructure, particularly given the uncertainty of
federal money in a new administration.



3.

Important Scientific Unknowns

In California, as in Washington, state agencies are cautiously
awaiting more concrete information about a few critical
unknowns surrounding OA and related policy.91 Of primary
importance is the effect of local contributions to OA in coastal
water bodies. Although a few scientific papers have addressed
this topic preliminarily,92 ongoing modeling efforts in California
will help reduce the uncertainty about how much difference
local contributions make to the overall OA picture. Similarly,
demonstration projects and other emerging science will help
specify how effective seagrass restoration/expansion and other

90. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
91. OPC staff participated in a recent forum at Stanford University focused on water
quality criteria. CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL, MEETING SUMMARY, OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION:
SETTING
WATER
QUALITY
GOALS
2016,
http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/_media_library/2017/01/OA_Uncommon_Dialogue.pd
f. Also, OPC is funding six demonstration projects to fill these scientific gaps. Ocean
Protection Council Meeting of October 17, 2016—Item 4: Consideration of Authorization
to Disburse Proposition 84 Funds, CAL. OCEAN PROT. COUNCIL (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.opc.ca.gov/item-4-consideration-of-authorization-to-disburse-proposition84-funds/ [hereinafter OPC Meeting Notes].
92. See Richard A. Feely et al., The Combined Effects of Ocean Acidification, Mixing,
and Respiration on pH and Carbonate Saturation in an Urbanized Estuary, 88
ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 442, 443 (2010); Richard A. Feely et al., Chemical
and Biological Impacts of Ocean Acidification Along the West Coast of North America,
183 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 260 (2016).
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mitigating techniques might be.93 As soon as these scientific
data are available, discussions around mitigation and
adaptation can become more specific and targeted. In particular,
the SWRCB will very likely wait until hard data are available
before considering revising pH or nutrient Water Quality
Criteria, although OPC’s Task Force and Reduction Plan may
be able to drive the development of these kinds of data more
quickly than would have otherwise happened.
4.

Water Quality Criteria

Adopting new or revised Water Quality Criteria under the
Clean Water Act is perhaps the most concrete way in which
states could move to quickly mitigate the effects of OA, hypoxia,
and related issues. However, water quality has been a policy
battleground for decades, and OA is not likely to be the issue
that tips the scales in favor of more comprehensively regulating
water pollution from either point or nonpoint sources.94 A key
strategy question is whether there is sufficient political appetite
in California (or elsewhere) to take on a revision of Water
Quality Criteria, which Washington has so far declined to do.
Some evidence points to the existence of such an appetite in
California: its mention in the new OA legislation, discussion at
high levels (OPC, SWRCB, SCCWRP), and conversation at the
recent Stanford-sponsored Uncommon Dialogue, which focused
on the water quality question.95 Nevertheless, nonpoint source
pollution is a political third rail in California and any other state
in which agriculture (with which nonpoint source pollution is
associated) is a major industry.96 This seems unlikely to change,
although as noted above in the discussion of missing
constituencies, OA does provide a new lens through which to

93. For example, consider the six projects funded by OPC that are ongoing. See OPC
Meeting Notes, supra note 91.
94. Several years ago, one source expressed this sentiment to me as (to paraphrase):
“[K]ids are dying of selenium poisoning in their drinking water in the Salinas Valley,
and you want to change Water Quality Criteria because oysters are somewhat unhappy
in current ocean conditions?” This is an excellent moral, practical, and political question
to keep in mind in any conversation surrounding water quality.
95. See discussion of this meeting, supra note 91.
96. For one of many discussions of the challenges of nonpoint-source pollution
regulation in agricultural areas, see Mark Lubell, Policy Perspective: Is Non-Point
Source Pollution a Myth?, CTR. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y & BEHAVIOR (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://environmentalpolicy.ucdavis.edu/node/158.
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understand the impacts of nutrient pollution on the coastal
ocean and the human communities that depend upon it.
5.

Communications and Messaging

A minority of Americans has even heard of OA,97 let alone
engaged on the issue. Consequently, a central challenge in
building a political constituency for OA is adequately
communicating the challenge to new and more diverse groups
who are likely to have concrete interests in OA and in the ways
it might be addressed. I suggest that “water pollution” is likely
to be a successful framing for OA as an issue. “Air pollution” (as
a frame) engenders far more policy support for greenhouse gas
reductions than does “climate change” or related frames,98
perhaps in part because of co-benefits of air-pollution reduction
such as declines in asthma.99 By analogy, “water pollution” may
be an effective and accurate way of linking OA to larger waterquality issues, entraining a more varied suite of constituents,
and building popular support for mitigation and adaptation.
Such a framing perhaps rightly situates OA as an issue squarely
within the purview of OPC, the Water Boards, and other
agencies concerned with surface water quality in California, and
can provide important links to co-benefits of OA reduction, such
as mitigating eutrophication, hypoxia, and HABs. A concern
with framing OA squarely as a water pollution issue is that
doing so may make it more difficult to build support among
those who are passionate about climate change (and therefore,
perhaps OA) but have been less engaged on water-quality
issues. Alternatively, “water quality” may be a useful frame for
developing actionable policy elements that overlap with existing
water-quality constituencies, while a broader “global change”
frame is useful for connecting with climate-change and allied

97. Summer 2012 Special Report: Public Awareness of Ocean Acidification, THE
OCEAN
PROJECT,
http://theoceanproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Special_Report_Summer_2012_Public_Awareness_of_Ocean_
Acidification.pdf. But see L.C. Frisch et al., Gauging Perceptions of Ocean Acidification
in Alaska, 53 MARINE POL’Y 101, 105 (2015) (suggesting a majority of Alaskans had
heard of OA).
98. M. Mossler et al., How Does Framing Affect Policy Support for Emissions
Mitigation? Testing the Effect of Ocean Acidification and Other Carbon Emissions
Frames, 45 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE 63, 63 (2017).
99. EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990 ES-4 (1997),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/contsetc.pdf.
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constituencies.100
HABs, too, are a crucial link to human well-being and to the
fishing community specifically.101 Talking about OA as a
phenomenon of global ocean change related to HABs may bring
agencies, industry, and others into the OA conversation to a
greater degree. However, stronger science describing the
interactions between OA and HABs is needed to effectively
facilitate these communications.
IV. EMERGING ISSUES
Many open questions persist at the boundary of emerging OA
science and policy. What follows is a summary of questions and
ideas that respondents102 suggested, which I include here to
illustrate the frontiers along which policy actors are thinking.
1.

2.
3.

4.

In what ways can OA policy better link to existing
agency mandates and programs leverages
government
investment
in
science
and
infrastructure, and therefore build a broader OA
constituency? These mandates and programs
include marine protected areas, National Estuarine
Research Reserves, artificial reefs, oyster reefs
(particularly with reference to flood control),
aquaculture health and safety, and others.
What does social adaptation to OA look like? Can
we define what it means to be prepared for change
we can’t prevent?
How can OA policy actions best dovetail with
existing social priorities—for example by helping
vulnerable human communities—to create noregrets social/ecological policies?
What are the costs and benefits of legislative versus
administrative action on OA, and how should we
start thinking about information needs and
constituency development for each? This seems an
especially relevant question in the context of

100. An important note here: “climate change” (as a frame) can alienate
constituencies. Alaska declined to participate in the West Coast OA/H Panel because of
its explicit link to anthropogenic climate change.
101. As illustrated by the economic and social effects of the emergency crab fishery
closure in 2016, supra note 40.
102. Respondents were the interviewees listed in supra note 1.
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California’s recent state legislation on OA, and the
political changes at the federal level that will
continue to emerge with the change of presidential
administration in 2017, such that the choice of
legislative versus administrative forum might
differ depending on the jurisdiction in question.
With respect to administrative action and to water
quality criteria in particular, what is the return-oninvestment (in terms of OA harm reduction) we
might expect, given the timelines, capital cost, and
political cost of action?
What is the overall vision guiding the set of coastal
environmental policies at issue here? What are the
relevant targets at which OA/hypoxia actions
should ultimately aim? We live in a changing world,
and the management question is not how to
maintain status quo, but instead, what we want our
world to look like and how to get there.
What is the minimum set of information California
needs to arrive at a decision on each of its likely OA
policy decision points, and how can California
realistically secure funding to develop the needed
information?
Given the recent OPC-funded efforts in
biogeochemical modeling to inform California
policy questions,103 developing social-science
modeling or experimentation to integrate with
those data would help determine least-cost ways of
meeting ocean chemistry goals. For example,
voluntary and incentive-based programs might
achieve greater gains at a lower cost than
regulatory approaches to OA, but finding out would
require dedicated research on the matter.
How dependent are California and its science
community on federal support—either political or
financial—in moving OA science forward? Given
the change of presidential administration in early
2017, are adjustments necessary? If so, what are
likely sources of support for the necessary science?
How would California likely respond to a lawsuit
from conservation organizations, similar to

103. E.g., the six projects funded by OPC in October 2016, supra note 93.
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previous suits against Washington State?
With respect to regional and international
coordination, what effect will the Pacific Coast
Collaborative have in the U.S. and Canada, and
elsewhere? One attractive element of a larger,
region-wide collaborative policy effort is the option
of developing regional pollutant limits, as states in
the Northeast have done with mercury emissions
and other air pollutants.104 Could this be a model
for concerted West Coast CO2 action? What will
come of the International Alliance to Combat Ocean
Acidification?
Relevant to the discussion surrounding networked
resources and interactions among jurisdictions, it is
worth noting that regional monitoring and
science—standing alone—does not mitigate
anything.
The costs of routine ocean chemistry monitoring
continue to be high, and only specialized and
reasonably well-funded entities such as wastewater
dischargers or aquaculture firms (e.g., Taylor
Shellfish and Hog Island Oyster Company) are
likely to acquire high-precision monitoring tools.105
Will the costs of routine monitoring drop with the
development of tools such as the SeaFET and SAMI
sensors, enabling citizen-science groups and other
non-specialist users?
Relatedly, if the costs of monitoring come down and
reliability increases, what ways might state water
quality regulators start building monitoring

104. See NESCAUM: NORTHEAST STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MANAGEMENT ,
http://www.nescaum.org/ (last visited June 13, 2017). Interestingly, airborne pollutants
such as mercury—and CO2—can be eligible for Clean Water Act funding under § 319
because they become nonpoint source water pollutants. For example, the state of
Michigan has a statewide Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) for nonpoint-source
mercury, most of which comes from atmospheric deposition. MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
QUALITY, STATEWIDE MICHIGAN MERCURY TMDL PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT ES-2 (2013),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/wrd-swas-hgtmdl-draft_415360_7.pdf
(“In
Michigan, the majority of mercury pollution is a result of atmospheric deposition.”).
105. For example, Sunburst Sensors LLC won an international competition—the $2
million Wendy Schmidt Ocean Health X-Prize—in 2015 for creating high-precision pH
sensors that were also affordable. These units remain in prototype, but the company
anticipates them being available commercially in 2017. When available, they will cost
thousands of dollars. Telephone Interview with James Beck, Co-Owner, Sunburst
Sensors LLC (May 10, 2017).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss1/2

28

Kelly: Ocean Acidification Policy: Applying the Lessons of Washington to

2017]

15.

V.

OCEAN ACIDIFICATION POLICY

29

requirements into new NPDES permits/waste
discharge requirements? Would these data be
useful for biogeochemical monitoring of the kind
envisioned for OA, hypoxia, and related issues?
A longer-term question is whether, and how, OA
efforts might link to California’s cap-and-trade
greenhouse gas system for reducing CO2. For
example, it might be reasonable to create carbon
credits for storage through eelgrass/seagrass
restoration if the science were there to support it
and the policy tools were in place to properly
account for the additionality (or lack thereof)
associated with such restoration efforts. Another
high-level respondent referred to this linkage as a
“secret hope,” as it would legitimize OA mitigation
while creating incentives (i.e., value) for action.
Note that this policy path would bridge social
adaptation and mitigation, while providing the cobenefits associated with seagrasses and wetlands.

CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, two identifiable waves of OA work have
focused on (1) the existence of OA as a phenomenon,106 and (2)
drivers and consequences of that phenomenon.107 The third
wave of work—what to do about it—has built more slowly, but
has a clear trajectory, with NOAA showing early interest, and
then Washington, Oregon, California, Maine, Massachusetts,
Maryland, and New York taking some amount of state-level
action on OA in the past three years.108 California, in particular,
has both the scientific and the policy infrastructure in place to
develop a sustained program on OA and related issues.
Maintaining this focus will require new science to answer the
key policy question quite reasonably posed by California
106. E.g., Joan A. Kleypas et al., Geochemical Consequences of Increased Atmospheric
Carbon Dioxide on Coral Reefs, 284 SCI. 118 (1999); THE ROYAL SOC’Y, OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE (2005),
www.royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/
2005/9634.pdf.
107. E.g., Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: The Other CO 2 Problem, 1 ANN .
REV. OF MARINE SCI. 169 (2009); Wei-Jun Cai et al., Acidification of Subsurface Coastal
Waters Enhanced by Eutrophication, 4 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 766, 766 (2011).
108. Sarah R. Cooley, et al., Community-Level Actions that Can Address Ocean
Acidification, 2 FRONTIERS MARINE SCI. 1, 7 (2016); Assemb. B. 10264, 2016 Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2016) (enacted) (establishing the New York State ocean acidification task force).
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agencies: can we really make a difference, and if so, how much?
Long-term success will require a broader and more diverse
political constituency than OA currently enjoys. Developing this
constituency requires directly linking OA to human well-being,
and in turn, conceiving of OA in the broader context of a
changing ocean in which warming, hypoxia, HABs, and other
related challenges simultaneously shift ecosystems and the
services from which societies benefit.
VI. APPENDIX: KEY INSTITUTIONS
Among the institutions likely to be centers of gravity for
future OA and related policy work along the West Coast are
Washington’s Marine Resources Advisory Council and
Departments of Ecology and Natural Resources, and
California’s Ocean Protection Council and State Water
Resources Control Board. These institutions are state
governmental bodies with significant connections to academia,
industry, NGOs, and federal agencies. As such, they may be able
to overcome the chicken-or-egg problems that underlie many of
the potential OA policy actions by setting up clear science-policy
questions, generating relevant data, and then acting on those
data in relatively short order.
A.

Washington

The Marine Resources Advisory Council (MRAC)109 is a nonregulatory (i.e., advisory) panel in the Washington Governor’s
office, created by statute110 as a result of the Blue Ribbon Panel’s
recommendations. The purpose of the Council is to function as
a forum for the exchange of views and information, without the
immediate possibility of regulation.111 Its role is to coordinate
among stakeholders, advise the Governor and scientists at the
University of Washington, seek funding to advance its own
recommendations, and do public outreach and education.112
The Washington OA Center is a research entity at the
University of Washington, created by statute following the Blue

109. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.338 (2016).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Ribbon Panel’s recommendations to serve the state.113 It
coordinates research among University and allied scientists
(e.g., NOAA, Department of Ecology) on OA and provides
scientific input to the Marine Resources Advisory Council and
the Governor’s office.114
The Washington State Department of Ecology is the main
state regulatory agency for environmental affairs. 115 The
Department of Ecology facilitates work on OA in Washington
through collaborations with NOAA, UW, and others.116 The
Department of Ecology also has regulatory authority over water
and air quality in the State, and as such it combines functions
that some other States have separated into different
administrative agencies (e.g., California has separate air- and
water-quality control agencies).117 The Department of Ecology is
therefore both a producer of OA information and a target
audience for that same information.
The Washington State Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) is the state agency that manages state trust lands to
generate revenue and to preserve public natural resources
including forests, water, and aquatic lands.118 DNR’s current
strategic plan calls for developing OA mitigation and adaptation
strategies, and its role as steward of aquatic lands could put the
agency in an important position for testing—and developing
incentives for—policy actions in nearshore habitat.119
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.105.150 (2016) (establishing funding for the OA Center);
see also Amanda Carr, We Can Lead: Washington State’s Efforts to Address Ocean
Acidification, 3 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 188 (2013) (describing Washington’s
experience with OA policy); Amanda Carr, Continuing to Lead: Washington State’s
Efforts to Address Ocean Acidification, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 543 (2016)
(describing Washington’s progress in addressing OA and its influence on other States).
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.105.150 (2016).
115. Id. § 43.21A.020 (2016).
116. WASH. A DMIN. CODE § 173-98-010 (2013); Water Quality Program, WASH. STATE
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY (2016), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/wqhome.html. For an
example of such collaboration and facilitation, see the Department of Ecology’s hosting
of the Marine Resources Advisory Council’s website and meetings, which feature content
from NOAA, University of Washington, and many others. Ocean Acidification and
Washington
State,
WASH.
STATE
DEP’T
OF
ECOLOGY,
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/water/marine/oceanacidification.html (last visited June 13,
2017).
117. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm (last visited June
13, 2017); CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov (last
visited June 13, 2017).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.30 (2016).
119. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 2014–2017 STRATEGIC PLAN 11, 35 (June 2014),
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The NOAA Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory is a
federal laboratory, located in Seattle and focused on
atmospheric and oceanographic research. 120 The lab has close
ties to the University of Washington, the Department of
Ecology, and related researchers, and its work has underpinned
much of the scientific consensus surrounding OA in
Washington.121
B.

California

The California Ocean Protection Council (OPC) is a nonregulatory, cabinet-level body that coordinates administrative
agencies and suggests legislative and policy actions on ocean
issues in California. OPC is the entity through which the state’s
new OA legislation—AB 2139 (Williams, Ocean Acidification
and Hypoxia Task Force) and SB 1363 (Monning, Ocean
Acidification and Hypoxia Reduction Program)122—will work.
Given the express role of the OPC in California’s environmental
apparatus, and especially given OPC’s role in helping to convene
the OA/H panel and as the locus of new statutory cover for OA
work, it seems likely that OPC will be a center of gravity for OArelated work in California for the foreseeable future. In
particular, OPC has recently funded six projects to follow up on
the Panel’s recommendations,123 and will be using the new
legislation to guide the implementation of the state’s OA
program over the coming years. Historically, OPC has had
significant bond funding to invest in strategic research, on-theground restoration and environmental protection projects, and
policy development (for example, Proposition 84124 provided
funding, supporting the first round of work under the new
legislation). Future legislation will need to fund research and
other OA-related activities if those activities—and OPC’s role in
http://file.dnr.wa.gov/publications/em_strategic_plan_2014_2017.pdf.
120. About PMEL, NOAA PACIFIC MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY,
https://pmel.noaa.gov/about-pmel (last visited June 13, 2017).
121. E.g., Richard A. Feely et al., Evidence for Upwelling of Corrosive “Acidified”
Water onto the Continental Shelf, 320 SCI. 1490, 1490 (2008).
122. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 35630–35632 (West Supp. 2017).
123. OPC Meeting Notes, supra note 91.
124. The Safe Drinking Water, Water Quality and Supply, Flood Control, River and
Coastal Protection Bond Act of 2006 (Proposition 84) passed in 2006, authorizing $5.388
billion.
Proposition
84
Overview,
CAL.
NAT.
RES.
AGENCY,
http://bondaccountability.resources.ca.gov/p84.aspx (last visited June 13, 2017).
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the field—are to remain stable in the long run. OPC’s partners
include scientists in the field, the NOAA OA program, and the
Pacific Coast Collaborative partners in other jurisdictions.
California Ocean Science Trust (OST) is a non-profit entity
created by state statute, and guided by a Board of Trustees
appointed by the Secretary for Natural Resources.125 OST works
to integrate science and decision-making across state agencies,
and convenes the OPC’s Science Advisory Team.126 OST plans
to continue working with the OPC and its Science Advisory
Team to address some of the critical science needs raised by the
OA/H Panel’s recommendations. In light of its mission and past
activities, OST could also potentially take on roles supporting
the science task force required by the Williams bill. 127
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) is a state
agency—under the larger umbrella of the California
Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA)—with authority
over both water quality and water quantity (allocation), 128 the
former of which is particularly relevant for OA policy in
California. Although authority for developing most terrestrial
water quality objectives and plans falls to nine Regional Water
Quality Control Boards, the state-level Board remains the
primary responsible agency for the California Ocean Plan and
the Enclosed Bays & Estuaries Plan, the two sets of standards,
criteria, and implementation measures that are most relevant
for OA, hypoxia, and related issues.129 Consequently, to the
extent there is a political appetite to develop or revise relevant
Water Quality Criteria—and to the extent that compelling data
exist on which to base such criteria—the SWRCB would lead
that effort. Presumably, the SWRCB and the OPC would work
together should new Criteria become necessary, although there
is not currently a dedicated mechanism for such cooperation.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is a State

125. About Us, CAL. OCEAN SCI. TR. http://www.oceansciencetrust.org/about-us/ (last
visited June 13, 2017).
126. Id.
127. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35631 (West Supp. 2017).
128. CAL. WATER CODE § 174(b) (West Supp. 2017).
129. In addition to the Plans stated, several amendments to other Plans were recently
adopted or are under development. See Ocean Standards, CAL. STATE WATER RES.
CONTROL BD.,
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/ocean/index.shtml (last visited
June 13, 2017).
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agency—also under the umbrella of CalEPA—with authority to
regulate greenhouse gases and other air pollutants. 130 It
remains unclear how to link policy mechanisms for mitigating
OA with California’s larger efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions such as the current CO2 cap and trade system.131 To
date, CARB has not been a major contributor to the OA/H policy
process in California, but it remains conceptually important as
a possible link to the state’s mechanism for reducing the
ultimate causes of OA.132
The Pacific Coast Collaborative is an association among
California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (with
Alaska observing) formed in 2008133 to better coordinate actions
to address climate change and related effects, of which OA is
one. This body is important for regional-scale coordination and
for outreach to the wider international community.134

130. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39003 (West 2009).
131. Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited May 7, 2017).
132. The current discussion draft of the 2030 cap & trade scoping plan highlights some
potential work on eelgrass with respect to OA. CAL. AIR RES. BD., 2030 TARGET SCOPING
PLAN UPDATE, DISCUSSION DRAFT 64, 67 (2016),
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2030target_sp_dd120216.pdf.
133. MEMORANDUM TO ESTABLISH THE PACIFIC COAST COLLABORATIVE (June 30,
2008), http://pacificcoastcollaborative.org/agreements/.
134. This outreach may take place through the recently announced International
Alliance on OA. See INT’L ALL. TO COMBAT OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, http://oaalliance.org
(last visited May 7, 2017).
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